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ABSTRACT
With the increasingly pervasive role of software in society, se-
curity is becoming an important quality concern, emphasizing
security by design, but it requires intensive specialization.
Security in families of systems is even harder, as diverse
variants of security solutions must be considered, with even
different security goals per product. Furthermore, security is
not a static object but a moving target, adding variability.
For this, an approach to systematically address security
concerns in software product lines is needed. It should con-
sider security separate from other variability dimensions. The
main challenges to realize this are: (i) expressing security and
its variability, (ii) selecting the right solution, (iii) properly
instantiating a solution, and (iv) verifying and validating it.
In this paper, we present our research agenda towards
addressing the aforementioned challenges.
CCS Concepts
•Software and its engineering → Software design trade-
offs;
1. INTRODUCTION
Security is becoming an increasingly important software
quality, emphasized by the growing number of discovered vul-
nerabilities. This affirms the principle of security by design,
making it being explicitly considered during development [14,
6], and even part of the development lifecycle [5]. However,
building secure systems remains complex, requiring intensive
specialization, while fixing newly discovered flaws further
complicates things. This makes the incorporation of security
a highly challenging objective.
In general, designing security solutions (driven by, for
example, methods and techniques such as STRIDE [5]) is in
essence a targeted search in a wide, complex, and constantly
changing variability space, for a solution that meets the
security requirements or represents an appropriate trade-off
between different requirements. Systematic approaches are
lacking to cover the entire decision making process.
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To enable a systematic approach, support for expressing
and modeling security [12] and its variability is needed. This
allows to evaluation and instantiation of alternative security
solutions using, for example, pattern instantiation [3]. In
this paper, we outline our research agenda toward addressing
the following research questions:
RQ1: How can we model security variability? RQ1 covers:
(i) the high-level security solutions (external variability) and
(ii) the realizing mechanisms (internal variability).
RQ2: How can we instantiate the security solutions in the
design? RQ2 covers the instantiation of a solution and its
mechanisms in the design.
RQ3: How can we measure, evaluate, or assess the instanti-
ated security solutions? RQ3 covers: (i) evaluating whether
a product fulfills the security requirement, (ii) verifying if
a solution is sound (e.g., no conflicting mechanisms), and
(iii) providing additional information for the selection.
RQ4: How can we offer support for selecting a specific re-
alization of a security solution? RQ4 covers supporting the
security engineer in making well-founded decisions when se-
lecting a specific realization of a solution, which is not trivial
because of the potential interactions between mechanisms.
2. RESEARCH APPROACH
We will apply demand-driven, applied research to realize
the approach. More specifically, we will test and validate
the ideas and approaches in industry cases, as we did in the
context of safety [11], and solve the problems encountered in
those specific contexts. In the end, we aspire to generalize
those solutions or reach conclusions regarding the difficulties
in generalizing for security. Our approach covers the different
software product line engineering activities [10].
Firstly, we consider security variability, consisting of:
(i) security goals, specifying the external security require-
ments, (ii) external variability, consisting of the different
security solutions used to realize those goals, and (iii) inter-
nal variability, covering the different ways to realize such a
solution. Making these aspects explicit, allows the engineer
to reason about a solution and the best way to realize it.
Selection support is necessary to assist the security en-
gineer during the selection process. There are many different
possible solutions, each having different realizations, exposing
the engineer to an exploding number of variants. In order to
make well-founded configuration trade-off decisions, guidance
is necessary to be able to make an informed decision.
Next, is the instantiation of the selected solution and
mechanisms in the design, requiring: (i) a generic represen-
tation of the system, and the locations in that system where
mechanisms can be applied, (ii) a generic representation of
the security mechanisms, which link to the system model
elements they can be applied to, and (iii) meta-information
on the security mechanisms necessary to combine or link
them together in order to realize a solution.
Finally, there is the measurement and assessment of
the security in the variants. This step provides the possibility
to verify the correctness of the instantiated mechanisms and
to allow the security engineer to make trade-off decisions
between different combinations of security mechanisms to
realize a security solution.
3. PRELIMINARY KEY RESULTS
In previous work, we developed a reference approach for
providing selection support for the safety engineer in making
trade-off decisions [11, 13]. We offered external and internal
variability models for configuring the safety solution for an
automotive Hall-Effect sensor and provided tactics to counter
the problem of variant explosion. This is especially relevant
for security with an even broader variability space. However,
important differences to safety are: (i) less standardization,
(ii) less domain-specific (iii) issues such as no uniform con-
ceptual framework [2], terminological confusion [1], etc.
In previous work [12], we introduced a set of concepts to
model security solutions at a single abstraction level. These
should be extended to handle multiple abstraction levels in
order to distinguish between high-level solutions and their
realizing mechanisms. This more flexible model allows the
distinction between external and internal variability models.
4. RELATEDWORK
Mellado et al. [7] presented the SREPPLine approach
for managing security variability in software product lines
for conformance with ISO/IEC 27001 and 15408. Fægri
and Hallsteinsen [4] discuss a software product line reference
architecture for security, using a security submodel, linking to
architectural and decision support submodels. Mylla¨rniemi
et al. presented KumbangSec [8], an approach for modeling
functional and security variability by extending Kumbang
with security engineering concepts. Finally, there are the
security pattern catalogs, on which Yskout et al. [15] provide
an aggregate view. They are a source of information on
the structure of security solutions, and the mechanisms they
comprise. Related to the patterns is the work of Nguyen et
al. [9], which provides a feature model with security patterns
and a meta-model for instantiating them.
5. CONCLUSION
The lack of a common set of security constructs and conflict-
ing interpretations complicate the design of security solution.
To improve this situation, a uniform conceptual framework
is necessary. This is especially important in the context of
software product lines, as it is necessary to make the link
between security solutions and their mechanisms explicit to
allow for trade-off evaluation and traceability.
Additionally, constructing the design of a security solution,
enables automatic instantiation of the mechanisms by using
techniques such as pattern instantiation. It prevents the
introduction of errors or flaws, and minimizes overhead.
Finally, security mechanisms can be assessed and veri-
fied to prevent conflicting interactions and obtain stronger
guarantees that a solution is correctly realized in a product.
It also provides future possibilities in measuring, assessing,
evaluating and making security trade-off decisions.
Acknowledgements. The presented research is partially
funded by the Research Fund KU Leuven.
6. REFERENCES
[1] R. Anderson. Security engineering. John Wiley & Sons,
2008.
[2] J. Bau and J. C. Mitchell. Security modeling and
analysis. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 9(3):18–25, 2011.
[3] T. Degueule, O. Barais, M. Acher, J. Le Noir,
S. Madele´nat, G. Gailliard, G. Burlot, O. Constant,
et al. Tooling support for variability and architectural
patterns in systems engineering. In Proceedings of the
19th International Conference on Software Product
Line, pages 361–364. ACM, 2015.
[4] T. E. Fægri and S. Hallsteinsen. Software product lines.
chapter A Software Product Line Reference
Architecture for Security, pages 275–326. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006.
[5] M. Howard and S. Lipner. The security development
lifecycle. O’Reilly Media, Incorporated, 2009.
[6] G. McGraw. Software security: building security in.
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2006.
[7] D. Mellado, E. Ferna´ndez-Medina, and M. Piattini.
ICETE 2008, Porto, Portugal, July 26-29, 2008,
Revised Selected Papers, chapter Security Requirements
Management in Software Product Line Engineering,
pages 250–263. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[8] V. Mylla¨rniemi, M. Raatikainen, and T. Ma¨nnisto¨.
Kumbangsec: An approach for modelling functional
and security variability in software architectures. In
VaMoS, pages 61–70, 2007.
[9] P. H. Nguyen, K. Yskout, T. Heyman, J. Klein,
R. Scandariato, and Y. L. Traon. Sospa: A system of
security design patterns for systematically engineering
secure systems. In MODELS, 2015 ACM/IEEE 18th
International Conference on, pages 246–255, Sept 2015.
[10] K. Pohl, G. Bo¨ckle, and F. J. van der Linden. Software
Product Line Engineering: Foundations, Principles and
Techniques. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[11] L. Sion, D. Van Landuyt, W. Joosen, and G. de Jong.
Systematic quality trade-off support in the software
product-line configuration process. In Proceedings of
the 20th International Software Product Line
Conference, SPLC ’16. ACM, 2016.
[12] L. Sion, K. Yskout, A. van den Berghe, R. Scandariato,
and W. Joosen. MASC: Modelling Architectural
Security Concerns. In Proceedings of the Seventh
International Workshop on Modeling in Software
Engineering, pages 36–41. IEEE Press, 2015.
[13] D. Van Landuyt, S. Op de beeck, A. Hovsepyan,
S. Michiels, W. Joosen, S. Meynckens, G. de Jong,
O. Barais, and M. Acher. Towards managing variability
in the safety design of an automotive hall effect sensor.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Software
Product Line Conference, September 2014.
[14] J. Viega and G. McGraw. Building Secure Software:
How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way.
Pearson Education, 2001.
[15] K. Yskout, T. Heyman, R. Scandariato, and W. Joosen.
A system of security patterns. 2006.
